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THE THREAT TO CITIZEN PARTICIPATION
IN MODEL CITIES
Barlow Burke, Jr.-
Citizen participation has been advocated as an essential feature
of urban antipoverty programs. Ideally, such participation can serve
both individual and societal goals. It can provide self-realization and
develop personal competence in participants. It can also promote sub-
stantively better decisions for government, integrate alienated groups
into the governmental process, make government more visible, and
gain consent and confidence for a program from the citizenry.
All too often, however, bureaucracy has retained a great deal
of control over the participatory aspects of governmental programs.
The resultant overregulation has stifled the potentially creative role
that citizens might have played and destroyed program credibility.
There are indications that this is now happening in the Model Cities
Program funded by the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD). History can forewarn us of the dangers that program
now faces.
I
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN FEDERAL PROGRAMS SINCE THE 1930'S
The earliest example of citizen participation in the 1930's was the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).1 Created by federal statute,2 the
TVA widely publicized its programs of electric power production,
fertilizer manufacturing, land-use planning, and land acquisition as
being administered at the grass-roots level. By this, TVA meant joint
administration of its programs with existing citizen groups and local
governments. The TVA staff saw participation as the "cooptation" of
voluntary groups and local governments; that is, "the process of absorb-
ing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure
of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or
- Assistant Professor of Law, The American University, Washington College of
Law. A.B. 1963, Harvard University; LL.B. 1966, M.C.P. 1968, University of Pennsylvania;
LL.M. 1970, Yale University.
1 The following summary of the TVA's approach is based on P. SELZNiCK, TVA
AND THE GRASS ROOTs: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF FORnAL ORGANIZATION (1949). This
book has become a classic in the area of citizen participation.
2 Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16 U.S.C. §§ 831-31dd (1964).
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existence."3 The Authority's grass-roots doctrine provided some justifi-
cation for its existence as a governmental agency uniquely concerned
with regional development and was useful in facilitating acceptance
of its programs. Since TVA seldom investigated the depth of support
and democratic character of the groups and governments with which
it sought to cooperate, it was never assailed by the many doubts that
plagued later citizen participation programs.
The Subsistence Homesteads Division (SHD) of the Department
of the Interior was created in 1933 to deal with the redistribution of the
"overbalance of population" thought to exist in our industrial centers.
People were to be moved into the country and given "subsistence home-
steads." 4 In an attempt to avoid the delays and paternalism inherent
in the Washington bureaucracy, the Division's Director, M. L. Wilson,
convinced Secretary Ickes to establish the Federal Subsistence Home-
steads Corporation which, through local subsidiary corporations man-
ned largely by people in project areas, would serve as the governing
body for projects undertaken by the Division." At first, the Division's
staff operated with considerable independence of the Secretary's office,
but this situation did not last more than a year. After a series of con-
flicts with the SHD staff over administrative procedures, Ickes abolished
the subsidiary corporations in March 1934 and SHD was assigned the
duty of directing local projects through its field agents.6
The Farm Security Administration (FSA) was the most reform-
minded of all the New Deal agencies created to deal with rural prob-
lems. The Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act of 1937,7 which created
FSA, emphasized programs to aid non-owner farmers who were poverty-
stricken. Committees of local farmers were to administer a series of
loan programs to help tenants buy land, purchase equipment, and in-
crease yields. Despite the belief of some House leaders and officials in
the Department of Agriculture that delegating administrative respon-
sibility to such committees was a "dangerous diffusion of executive
responsibility" and "an invitation to amateur incompetence,"8 the
measure was enacted. Once its program was underway, FSA encouraged
8 P. SELZNICK, supra note 1, at 13.
4 Authority to encourage such redistribution was provided by the National In-
dustrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 208, 48 Stat. 205 (1935).
5 S. BALDWIN, POVERTY AND POLITICS: THE RIS AND DECLINE OF THE FARM SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION 69-73 (1968).
6 Id. at 73.
7 Act of July 22, 1937, ch. 517, 50 Stat. 522 (codified in scattered sections of 7, 18
U.S.C.).
8 S. BALDWIN, supra note 5, at 183. See also Maddox, The Bankhead.Jones Farm
Tenant Act, 4 LAw & CONTEmp. PROB. 434, 441-46 (1937).
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formation of agricultural groups to take advantage of its developing
group services program. "More discreetly, the leaders of the agency
hoped that such associations would significantly promote a sense of
social and political solidarity among the clientele, and weld them into
a politically more formidable power base for the FSA itself."9
Winning World War II required much citizen cooperation. On
V-J day in 1945, there were 275,000 volunteers working in the consumer
education, rationing, and price control programs of the Office of Price
Administration (OPA). The New Dealers early foresaw that any pro-
gram assuming extensive control over the American economy would
have to be supported by the public at large or it would surely fail.
OPA's volunteer program was the result.10 Initially, volunteers worked
as consumer educators. After Pearl Harbor, it quickly became apparent
that rationing was going to be necessary, and, in 1942, OPA created
boards manned by volunteers, sometimes assisted by paid clerks, to
ration the products of industries affected by the war. Eventually, the
whole system of ration books was administered by local boards. All
of these boards had the same purpose-to gain support for the
program among its constituents." Boards began their activities with
most members recruited from industries whose products were rationed
early in the war. Although membership was expanded by adding in-
dividuals from other occupations and minority groups, the unrepresen-
tative character of the boards was never fully overcome. 2 Furthermore,
in 1943, when price control became a major aspect of national policy,
there was a quick professional upstaffing in OPA and an eventual about-
face in policy; the local volunteer boards lost control of the overall
program administration and thereafter merely assisted in policing
community-wide price lists for retail products. 3
The Selective Service System (SSS) is a program which originated
before World War II in which volunteer citizens, serving on local
draft boards around the country, still have considerable power. They
implement policies that are very generally worded, and have great dis-
cretion in doing so. In 1940, it was thought that the only way the draft
could gain popular acceptance was to have it locally administered. An-
other rationale was that only local people would know the registrant
and also understand the community's needs for certain occupational
9 S. BAiwIN, supra note 5, at 204.
10 I. PUTNAM, VOLUNTEERS IN OPA 3 (1947).
11 Id. at 15-22.
12 Williams, Minority Groups and OPA, 7 Pun. AD. REV. 123 (1947).
13 I. PUTNAM, supra note 10, at 143-49.
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deferments. Thus, citizen participation was the price to be paid for
meeting the manpower needs of the military.
The actual result of this local participation has been a serious
lack of uniformity in deferment policy,14 long tenures in office for
volunteers, and serious doubt as to the representative character or
fairness of local boards.15 On the other hand, the result has been an
inexpensive and reasonably efficient system of induction, one that by
all measurable standards produces a high sense of satisfaction and
feeling of usefulness among those who participate on the boards. 16
Urban Renewal (UR) began the decade of the 1950's as a clearance
program authorized by the Housing Act of 1949.17 Citizens were not
consulted unless, as we have seen in many prior programs, the aims of
more "efficient" administration would also be served.'8 Citizens' advi-
sory committees existed in many cities after 1954, but only to serve
the ends of local programs: favorable publicity and liaison with busi-
ness interests. The most effective citizen participation consisted of
strong outside protests over relocation requirements and displacement
of individuals and small businesses; such citizen concern ultimately
helped the government recognize a need for more direct participation.19
Until the 1960's, then, citizen participation had been justified
primarily in administrative terms as an instrument of cooptation of
local government (TVA), building a bureaucracy's client group and
adjusting a program to the client's needs (FSA), ensuring citizen sup-
14 J. DAVIS & K. DOLBEARE, LrrrLE GROUPs OF NEIGHBORs: THE SELECrxVE SERVICE
SYSTEM 223 (1968).
15 The positions are appointive, filled by the President from a list of nominees
submitted by the governor of the state in which the member will serve. Military
Selective Service Act of 1967, § 1(8), 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (Supp. V, 1970).
Businessmen and government employees, in that order, constitute the two largest
occupational categories on the boards. J. DAvis & K. Do.BE ZE, supra note 14, at 57-67.
Whether the members of local boards represent a broad section of the public is question-
able. One study has found that of the 16,638 males serving on local boards, roughly
two-thirds were veterans, one-half were over 60 years of age, and one-half had served on
the board for over 10 years. Moreover, 30% of board members held college degrees and
40% were retired. Finally, only 1.3% of the total were Negroes, with some Southern
boards having no Negro members. Id. at 57-58.
16 J. DAvis & K. DoUIEARE, supra note 14, at 221. The system also seems to have the
confidence of local elites, whose sons are less likely to be drafted, and the antipathy of
the draft-prone lower socio-economic and non-white strata. Id. at 233.
17 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-86 (1964).
18 See J. LowE, CrnEs IN A RAE-WrrH Tim: PROGREss AND POVERTY IN AMERICA's
RENEWING Crrms 420-21 (1967).
19 Note, Citizen Participation in Urban Renewal, 66 CoLum. L. Rlv. 485, 498-500
(1966).
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port (OPA), providing low operating costs (SSS), or publicizing the
program (UR). The list of administrative justifications could be ex-
tended in each case were the nuances of these programs to be discussed,
but the point is essentially the same: when bureaucracy had some pre-
viously formulated program to implement, marginal citizen involvement
could serve administrative ends.
The War on Poverty of the mid- and late-1960's and the establish-
ment of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) 20 with its funding
of Community Action Programs (CAP) in the various pockets of
poverty throughout the country, represented a fundamental shift in
outlook toward citizen participation. In a real sense, participation
became an end unto itself rather than a means for bureaucrats to sim-
plify the administration of specific programs. The establishment of
OEO-CAP was meant to give the poor a voice in government; just as
the Departments of Labor and Commerce had been created to represent
interest groups within the government, the poor were to have
OEO.21 On the local level, OEO funded antipoverty groups directly,
by-passing city hall.22 At both levels, the rationale was one of "counter-
vailing power" rather than an attempt to work within existing struc-
tures.23 So when city hall, fearing the rising expectations of the poor,
applied political pressure to CAP groups in an effort to restrict their
independence, OEO offered task forces of experts to local groups ex-
periencing trouble,24 and increasing amounts of money were spent to
strengthen the programmatic expertise of local groups and thus in-
crease political power at the neighborhood level.25
It is important to keep in mind that both OEO-CAP and Model
Cities grew out of the confluence of ideas and desires-aimed at
ameliorating poverty and decentralizing government-which gripped
the social service professions during the 1960's. The latter program
built upon the former in the sense that its framers had the benefit of
hindsight; but in Model Cities there was a conscious effort to avoid
the shortcomings of OEO. How and why this effort failed is the story
that follows.
20 Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2711-2981 (1964).
21 R. KRAMER, PARTICIPATION OF THE POOR: COMPARATIVE COMMUNITY CASE STuDIES
IN THE WAR oN POVERTY 13-14 (1969).
22 See Hallman, The Community Action Program: An Interpretive Analysis, in
POWER, POVERTY AND URBAN POLICY 285 (W. Bloomberg & H. Schmandt eds. 1968).
23 R. KRAMER, supra note 21."
24 In the first year of this program, 22 "Technical Assistants" visited 37 projects.
OEO, STAP: SPECIAL TECHNICAL ASSIRANCE PROGRAmS 1967-68, at 3 (1969).
25 Hallman, supra note 22, at 294.
1971]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
II
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION UNDER THE DEMONSTRATION CITIES ACT
In the early 1960's, "citizen participation" was a rallying cry for
social planners employed by private foundations and the federal gov-
ernment.26 No matter what each wanted to do to get the poor out of
poverty, most agreed that as a first step it would be a good idea to con-
sult the poor themselves. Everyone agreed that the poor could at
least describe their problems to those who were capable of tackling
them;27 some also believed that the poor might be able to articulate
solutions. A dearth of program ideas at the federal level ultimately
clinched the argument in favor of participation.28 Moreover, the crea-
tion of a national policy for a myriad of localities seemed an impossible
task because variables at the local level were too many and too complex.
Local planning was thus substituted for federal program selection.29
Many reasons were given for having citizen participation in the
molding of programs. Some planners wanted to build "community
competence" in the poverty sector80 Participation was a way to train
local leaders, to help people articulate their views, and to build a com-
munal self-confidence among the poor. Others wanted to gain public
support for antipoverty programs by developing a constituency for
them. This tactic of cooptation, they thought, would guarantee that the
26 See generally P. MARRIS & M. REIN, DILEMMAS OF SOCIAL REFORM: POVERTY AND
COMMUNITY ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES 29-32 (1967). Certain material in the following
section is taken from Burke, Foster & Nash, Urban Public Policy Participation Networks,
3 URBAN & SOCIAL CHANCE REv., Spring 1970, at 15, and is reprinted with permission.
27 D. MOYNIHAN, MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING: COMMUNITY ACTION IN THE
WAR ON POVERTY 21-59 (1969).
28 The failure of so many programs in the War on Poverty also contributed to the
conviction that more citizen participation was needed in the Model Cities program. Cf.
Wilson, in Comments on the Demonstration Cities Program, 32 J. Am. INsT. PLANNERS 366,
367 (1966).
29 As it turned out, local planning meant putting together, hopefully in a unique
local mix, a combination of prepackaged federal programs. See Arnstein, A Ladder
of Citizen Participation, 35 J. Am. INsr. PLANNERS 216 (1969). However, this did not
necessarily imply that new bureaucracies were to be created on the local level. OEO
tended to create "separate and parallel" organizations in the period 1964-67. On the
other hand, Model Cities policy created separate organizations "only as a last resort."
Interview with H. Ralph Taylor, former Assistant Secretary of HUD for Model Cities,
in Washington, D.C., March 19, 1970.
So This was a major argument of the 1966 task force that formulated the ideas
of the Model Cities program, but it turned out to be an interim goal. Once started, the
process of building such competence led to demands for "citizen and community control."
Telephone Conversation with Grace Milgram, former Staff Member, Presidential Task
Force on Model Cities, New York City, Nov. 14, 1969.
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participatory program would effect some permanent social change.
Still others hoped to expand representation in a pluralistic political
system to include the poor and disadvantaged, and the political estab-
lishment was asked to adapt its structure to deal more effectively with
the poor. Finally, some social planners believed that since the 1930's
federal programs had been the victims of so-called administrative ex-
pertise; thus, democratization of the bureaucracy was needed in order
to make programs more effective.81
The institutional pattern to serve all of these social theories
evolved during the early 1960's. 32 The Ford Foundation's "gray areas"
program in several cities was an attempt to involve broad segments
of the poverty-sector community in public programs affecting their
lives. 33 New York City's Mobilization for Youth sought to focus the
attention and efforts of the whole community on the problems of edu-
cation.84 A similar issue-oriented approach to mobilizing community in-
volvement was incorporated into government in 1962 with the inception
of the juvenile delinquency programs in the Department of Justice
under Attorney General Robert Kennedy; the Washington staff for
these programs was drawn from many departments of the federal gov-
ernment as well as the private sector.35 These intellectual strains com-
bined to form OEO's Community Action Program in 1964, and, the
next year, Model Cities.
In the latter part of 1965, a nine-member presidential task force
was appointed by President Johnson to recommend a comprehensive
city planning program to deal with urban slums.8 6 Robert C. Wood,
then Professor of Political Science at Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology, was named its chairman. Initially, the work involved staff
preparation of papers to supply background materials to the task force.
One, originally drafted by Hans Spiegel, then of Columbia University's
Department of City Planning, was entitled "Community-Wide Citizen
Participation."8  This paper posed the question "Why Citizen Par-
ticipation?" and answered in terms of a "need to gain local public
81 See Sundquist, Origins of the War on Poverty, in ON FIGHTING POVERTY: PERSPEC-
TnrEs FRom ExPER ENCE 6, 9-18 (J. Sundquist ed. 1969).
82 P. MARRis & M. REIN, supra note 26, at 27-32.
38 Id. at 27; D. MOYNIHAN, supra note 27, at 35-36.
84 A MOYNniAN, supra note 27, at 88-59.
8t Id. at 63-65.
86 Interviews were conducted with members of this task force, and they form the
basis of much of this section. The author was also given access to the papers of the
staff.
37 Spiegel, Community-Wide Citizen Participation, in Presidential, Task Force on
Model Cities, Staff Papers 114 (Jan. 1966).
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acceptance of the social and physical planning programs."' 38 This
would be accomplished by educating the electorate, who, Spiegel rea-
soned, would not thereafter pressure their political leaders to veto
subsequent planning programs. Public support, once gained, would
become "an effective framework for action."39 Spiegel pointed out that
it takes no more time to consult people early in the planning process
than it does to present them with definitive proposals that would, in
all probability, have to be returned to the staff for reconsideration.
Moreover, participation would provide planners with a forum to float
"trial-balloon proposals." "The solution to the problem of delay is
not to avoid citizen participation, but rather to develop effective par-
ticipation .... -40
Reaffirming the early goal of OEO's participatory programs, Spie-
gel called for all-sector participation in the planning. The "entire
spectrum of citizen interests" must be represented, corporate executives
as well as poverty-level citizens. Yet this participation was to be moni-
tored: "Experience indicates that effective citizen participation in
physical and social planning matters requires some degree of profes-
sional staff assistance at both the district and city-wide levels. ' 41 A two-
level organization for participation, similar to the combination of Com-
munity Action Boards and Target Area Organizations in OEO
programs, was proposed. A city-wide coordinating group was to provide
a forum to "consider citizen action on broad policies and programs"
and to "provide direct community organization services and . . . spe-
cialized staff services to citizen groups" on the neighborhood level.42
These coordinators would essentially be drawn from the community-
organizing professions.
The final task force report, written by Wood, discussed citizen
participation in some detail. As Wood later put it, the choice was
between Montesquieu and Rousseau and he chose the former. The
report rejected the idea of funding a "direct democracy" of the poor,
as some OEO programs had done. Instead, it substituted a "general
will" filtered through local government and thereafter expressed by
a joint government-citizens' coordinating group in broad, consensus
terms. This body would seek, in contrast to OEO-CAP, to work within
the existing structure of local government. The operational concept
underlying this was that of "shared power," embodied in a "brokerage
38 Id. at 115.
39 Id. at 116.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 117.
42 Id. at 121.
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style of politics." This meant two things: (1) the community was to
share power among its strata and sectors, and (2) professional planners
and urban experts were to share power with lay citizens. 43
In October 1965, those task force members appointed to make
recommendations and draft the Model Cities legislation began their
deliberations in Washington." The question of citizen participation
was raised and appropriate language was inserted in the legislation as
a matter of course.
Once drafted, the bill passed quickly through Congress. The
President sent it to Congress on January 26, 1966. The House Banking
and Currency Committee's Subcommittee on Housing held public
hearings on the bil 45 in late February and early March 1966.46 The
first witness to appear on its behalf was Robert C. Weaver, Secretary
of Housing and Urban Development. His testimony stresied the im-
portance and novelty of the programs being "planned, developed, and
carried out by local people," without spelling out from which segments
of the "local" community they might be drawn.47 In his prepared
statement he discussed the groups that might serve on the boards of
local programs: "Citizens of the [target] area may be represented by
the chairmen or directors of representative neighborhood organizations
serving as members. ' '48 He saw target-area citizen participation as a
possibility, but apparently as only one of many relevant sources of
public opinion. 9
In the Senate, the Subcommittee on Housing, assisted by HUD
counsel, redrafted the bill in executive session in August.50 That bill
48 Interview with Robert C. Wood, former Undersecretary of HUD, in Cambridge,
Mass., Dec. 19, 1969. See Wood, Citizen Participation: A Call for Return to Community,
51 PUB. MANAGEMNT, July 1969, at 3, 8.
44 This group was directed by Chester Rapkin and was composed of five additional
members. Rapkin was a sociologist with extensive teaching and consulting experience
in city planning matters.
45 H.R. 12341, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
46 Hearings on H.R. 12341 Before the Subcomm. on Housing of the House Comm.
on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pts. 1-2 (1966).
47 Id., pt. 1, at 3.
48 Id. at 48.
49 One witness before the subcommittee who had supported heavy citizen involve-
ment in the city planning process was Paul Davidoff, then a professor of city planning
at Hunter College in New York City. His testimony, however, contains no reference
to the participatory aspects of the program. Id. at 467-502. Nor did any of the big-city
mayors who testified discuss these aspects. E.g., id. at 222-43 (testimony of John V.
Lindsay). The existence of OEO had perhaps conditioned Congress to accept citizen
participation as a component, but no one wanted to analyze in depth the problems raised.
The question may have been too controversial.
50 S. 8708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). The following chronology is taken from
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was debated, amended, and passed on August 19, 1966. Senator Muskie,
the floor manager of the bill, stressed the experimental nature of the
local programs without discussing who the "locals" were.51 The House
passed its version of the bill on October 14. A conference committee
met several days later and the President signed the final bill on Novem-
ber 3.
The House report on the bill spoke at length of "local" programs
and initiatives for dealing with the physical and social problems of the
city:512 "This is to be a local program, planned and carried out by local
people and based on local judgment as to the city's needs and its order
of priorities in meeting these needs." 53 The report went on to state that
"[t]he ultimate success of this new program rests upon the ability of
local people to assess their own most pressing problems and devise
their own solutions to those problems. The cities themselves, by their
actions, will determine which of them participate in this program.""5
Of coordination with existing OEO programs, the report said: "Many
of the educational and social services which must be part of the dem-
onstration program can be provided under community action pro-
grams supported by the Office of Economic Opportunity ... ."5 In
fact, OEO's programs with all of their emphasis on citizen participation
became a significant component in many Model Cities areas.
As enacted, the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Develop-
ment Act of 1966,6 expresses a somewhat cautious, careful concern for
citizen participation and community action:
(a) A comprehensive city demonstration program is eligible
for assistance under. .. this title only if-
(1) physical and social problems ... are such that a com-
prehensive city demonstration program is necessary... ; [and]
(2) the program is of sufficient magnitude ... to provide
... widespread citizen participation in the program, maximum
opportunities for employing residents of the area in all phases
of the program, and enlarged opportunities for work and
training.
(b) In implementing this subchapter the Secretary shall-
SENATE CoMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 89TH CONG., 2D SESS., SUMMARY Or Acrlvrn as
49-50 (1966). Final passage in the Senate was by a vote of 88 to 22. 112 CONG. Rzc.
27359 (1966). The House vote was 142 to 126. Id. at 28139.
51 112 CONG. REc. 20028 (1966).
52 H.R. REP. No. 1931, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
5s Id. at 6.
54 Id. at 14.
55 Id. at 10.
06 42 U.S.C. §§ 3301-74 (Supp. V, 1970).
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(1) emphasize local initiative in the planning, develop-
ment, and implementation of comprehensive city demonstra-
tion programs; [and]
(2) insure . . . prompt response to local initiative, and
maximum flexibility in programing, consistent with the re-
quirements of law and sound administrative practice .... 57
To implement the programs, the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development was "authorized to undertake such activities as he deter-
mines to be desirable to provide, either directly or by contracts or
other arrangements, technical assistance to city demonstration agen-
cies . .
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN Tim ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACT
In the summer of 1966, another task force was assembled to draw
up criteria for evaluating applications for first-round, one-year planning
grants.59 Participation was not heavily emphasized in the guidelines
that emerged. Instead, the need for "comprehensiveness" in, and local
commitment to, the programs was stressed. A program's likelihood of
success was also considered, but judgments made here turned out to
have no predictive value, and were dropped on the second round.
Rather than create new institutions for popular involvement, the
program was premised on the notion that local government could
still be used as a vehicle of reform for dealing with urban slums. 60
This does not mean that citizen participation was totally ignored.
It was encouraged to some degree: "Unless the citizens have a major
and meaningful role in the development of the plan itself, rather than
simply being asked to approve or veto, then citizen participation
does not mean very much."61 Through informal assistance rendered to
applicants, federal officials indicated that each application should con-
tain a section on the participatory aspects of the total program. The
57 Id. §§ 3303(a)-(b).
58 Id. § 3306.
59 Much of the following material was gathered from interviews with former officials
of the program. Interview with Robert C. Wood, supra note 43; Interview with H.
Ralph Taylor, supra note 29; Interview with Walter Farr, former Director, Model Cities
Administration, in New York City, April 6, 1970.
60 Some federal officials realized that local government would have to "stretch" its
capabilities to reach into the black slums of our cities. Interview with H. Ralph Taylor,
supra note 29. In a sense these officials were searching for programs that promised more
than they could provide for the next several years. A "high sights" policy was encouraged.
61 HUD Press Release (April 18, 1966).
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point is that the men who developed and administered Model Cities
were urban experts who wanted very much to distinguish themselves
and their program from "the OEO approach."62 They did not want to
create new local bureaucracies except as a last resort. Their original
concept was one of sharing power between citizens and local govern-
ment. It quickly went awry.
It is not easy (indeed, it may be impossible for the best empirical
researchers) to reconstruct the process by which the community par-
ticipation components of the programs were formed. The program
proposals forwarded to HUD spoke of citizen participation as some-
thing to be organized in the future. Perhaps the best example of the
type of rhetoric involved was contained in a proposal for the city of Oak-
land, California. It spoke of a one-year planning grant "to provide
people in the area with an equity position in their environment ...
[that is,] the creation of a variety of legal entities through which the
residents of the area will be provided a collective equity position in
the development process." 63 Joint ownership of common spaces was
to provide a basis for "stimulating community participation."64 A
block-by-block organization, interspersed with planning offices, was
also proposed in order to develop an indigenous trained staff. Block
leaders were to be salaried. 65
Thereafter the organizational structure of many of the 150-odd
Model Cities projects around the country reflected the confusion and
conflicts in ideology among program administrators.66 A task force
approach was often used, conforming to the agency structure of lo-
cal government and resulting in a committee to plan or run each
program, with overall supervision by a board of directors.67 This
produced more decentralization than exists in most OEO-CAP pro-
62 Interview with Robert C. Wood, supra note 48.
6 Oakland Redevelopment Authority & Gans-Kaplan Associates, Oakland: A Demon-
stration City 43 (undated) (on file, HUD Library, Washington, D.C.).
64 Id.
65 Id. at 98-96. The Gary, Indiana, submission likewise proposed a block-by-block
organization; it emphasized communication in a community that the planners called a
way-station or "temporary" home for many residents. But it also spoke of participation
as a process not presently existing but which was to be developed. City of Gary, Indiana,
Application to HUD for a Model Cities Grant 72-75 (April 27, 1967) (on file, HUD
Library, Washington, D.C.). Dayton, Ohio, emphasized organizing the community as a
first step. City of Dayton, Ohio, Model City Plan (undated) (on file, HUD Library,
Washington, D.C.). In the author's opinion, applications varied greatly in quality and
sophistication.
66 Interview with H. Ralph Taylor, supra note 29.
67 See Warren, Model Cities First Round: Politics, Planning, and Participation, 85
J. Am. INsr. PLANNERS 245,247 (1969).
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grams, and also a more fluid organization. As a result of conflicts
between administrative guidelines, however, the organization of these
programs may change in the future. These guidelines seem to confuse
the idea of expanding the basic capacities of local government with
control of the program. The former purpose, controlling in the Act,
may still require citizen input and preclude mayoral control. To
establish whether this is so or not may require litigation, but first
these guidelines must be examined.
Written guidelines on citizen participation initially emerged
after the "first generation" of Model Cities planning grants. HUD
Technical Assistance Bulletin (TAB) No. 3,08 promulgated in Decem-
ber 1968, expanded a 1967 version of City Demonstration Agency
(CDA) Letter No. 3,( 9 and was the first attempt by Washington to deal
with the realities of the program's orientation at the local level. TAB
No. 3 was premised on the supposition that residents of poor neighbor-
hoods distrust city government; they wanted "action" from the city
without understanding that its political power was fragmented among
many agencies and offices. 70 Likewise, the "model neighborhood" was
often viewed by the city as a "misleading abstraction"; in fact, it seldom
comprised a unified social system and was not identifiable to any of
its residents as a "neighborhood."171 With this in mind, the authors
suggested a checklist of questions which would indicate the program's
viability in the area. This checklist of questions included: (1) whether
the organizational structure of the program allowed a decision as to
who could best represent the target-area and develop a continuing pro-
cess of participation; (2) whether the representation was broad enough;
and (3) whether the program established regular lines of communication
between the city and the citizens.72 The "key to the partnership" be-
tween city and citizens was found to be technical assistance:
Citizens' distrust of public officials can neither be argued nor ra-
tionalized away. Public agencies' procedures, styles, and skills
cannot be changed solely by admonition or the carrot of new
Federal programs. Years of partnership may be necessary to com-
pensate for generations of distrust.
The most promising means of ensuring that the CDA-citizen
68 Citizen Participation in Model Cities, HUD Technical Assistance Bulletin No. 3,
MCGR 3110.3 (Dec. 1968) [hereinafter cited as TAB No. 3].
69 Citizen Participation, HUD City Demonstration Agency Letter, No. 3, MCGR
3100.3 (Nov. 30, 1967) [hereinafter cited as CDA Letter No. 3].
70 TAB No. 3, at 22.
71 Id. at 22-28.
72 Id. at 24-25.
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participation achieves [this objective] is the provision of technical
assistance to citizens. . . . [T]echnical assistance involves CDA
assignment of acceptable personnel and resources to the neighbor-
hood citizens organization in order to ensure that the citizens are
able to obtain access to the knowledge and information necessary
to enable them to make informed, intelligent contributions to the
planning and implementation of each city's program.73
To carry out this idea, TAB No. 3 went on to suggest that the neighbor-
hood group affiliated with the program hire a staff independently and
then combine it with the city's:
This strategy of technical assistance is not an "either/or"
alternative, a choice between either independent or public agency
staff. Experience indicates that technical assistance to the neigh-
borhood is most effective when it is a combination of both staff they
control and city staff, and when citizens accept and use both.74
This is a remarkable document, considering the usual language
of federal bureaus. Its ideas came out of a series of committee meetings
in the summer of 1968, attended by representatives of OEO, HEW,
HUD, and the Department of Labor.75 The concept of independent
technical assistance for citizens' groups was taken from a draft, written
in the early fall by HUD's Sherry Arnstein. Her basic idea was that
citizens be allowed to employ their own planning staffs. OEO wanted
a more detailed document, while the Labor Department opposed the
whole idea.76 This conflict was resolved in a final draft, which was then
reviewed by HUD contacts on the executive staffs of the Conference
of Mayors and the National League of Cities. Still officially the view
of the Department in 1971, over two years after its issuance, its current
effect on programs is slight. It has not been rescinded, but additional
guidelines have diluted its practical effect.
During the winter of 1968-69, the regional offices in HUD began
to formulate some guidelines, then largely unwritten, for giving may-
oral appointees more control over the programs around the country.77
At first, this meant that appointees of the mayor should sit on Model
Cities boards. To some already involved in local programs, this move
was seen as an attempt at "political control." Also stressed was the
need to eliminate all "conflicts of interest" from programs. That is,
78 Id. at 17-18.
74 Id. at 19.
7r Interview with Walter Farr, supra note 59.
76 Interview with H. Ralph Taylor, supra note 29.
77 This has produced significant litigation in the Philadelphia program. Text
accompanying notes 98-123 infra.
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Model Cities planning groups should not carry out their own proposals,
and the planning, operation, and evaluation functions should be
separate from each other. Taken together these policies were an at-
tempt to diminish the impact of the program on the existing political
structure of the community and to maintain the original position of
Model Cities as a city program.
These guidelines were largely codified by the Nixon Administra-
tion in CDA Letter No. 10A.78 This document represents more than
a reversion to the original intent of the legislation: it emphasizes the
need for coordination with existing city agencies and officials,79 and
it concurrently deemphasizes the need for reforming existing agencies
and "stretching" the capacities of local government through exposure
to target-area citizens.8 0 The Letter requires that "[t]he chief executive
... shall assume early, continuous, and ultimate responsibility for the
development, implementation, and performance of the Model Cities
Program."8'1 Further, he must use "his administrative authority and
political leadership" to support the program by coordinating public
and private agencies, establishing priorities and allocating resources,
and providing the CDA director with "operational access to his office."8' 2
Emphasis is also placed on the performance by the city of its "planning,
coordinating, and evaluating role" where city agencies administer pro-
jects under the program 83
HUD did, however, offer a later but separate statement of its
policy on citizen participation in CDA Letter No. 10B,8 4 issued jointly
78 Administrative Performance and Capability, HUD City Demonstration Agency
Letter No. 10A, MC 3135.1 (Dec. 1969) [hereinafter cited as CDA Letter No. 10A].
79 Id. at 1.
80 Id. at 2; Interview with H. Ralph Taylor, supra note 29.
81 CDA Letter No. 10A, at 2.
82 Id.
83 Id. These quotations suffice to make clear that, by its failure to mention how
citizen participation is to be reconciled with the policies expressed, new priorities are
being set for the programs around the country. This being a more recent regulation
than CDA Letter No. 3 (and TAB No. 3, written under its authority) it has precedence
over those documents as statements of policy. Indeed, CDA Letter No. 10A is explicit on
this point. Id. at 1.
84 Joint HUD-OEO Citizen Participation Policy for Model Cities Programs, HUD
City Demonstration Agency Letter No. 10B, MC 3135.1 (March 1970) [hereinafter cited
as CDA Letter No. 10B].
This policy has been communicated to local officials and programs workers in
different ways. Philadelphia officials learned of these rules in a letter from Floyd Hyde
(who replaced H. Ralph Taylor as Nixon's Assistant Secretary for Model Cities). Changing
the local program to conform to the new guidelines has been made a precondition for
receiving any operating funds beyond the planning stage. Text accompanying notes
102-03 infra. New Haven officials learned, of the new requirements in a letter from
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with OEO. Without dealing with the question of how to reconcile this
Letter with CDA Letter No. 10A, it provided:
The citizen participation component must be actively and con-
tinuously involved in planning, monitoring, evaluating, and influ-
encing the Model Cities program. It is the city's responsibility,
in good faith deliberation with its citizen participation component,
to define dearly and set forth the responsibilities and authority of
the citizen participation component in these areas.85
Among the criteria established for "meaningful citizen participation"
is the "availability of adequate resources by which citizens can receive
assistance in understanding" the program and can communicate the
needs of the citizens to the government."6 Included in the list of re-
sources necessary to achieve this aim is "independent technical assis-
tance,"87 but one has the sense that the idea has been downgraded some-
what.
How it is that the concept of citizen participation was first ex-
panded beyond the legislative intent in the administration of Model
Cities and then subsequently contracted is not easy to explain. A spot-
check of initial program proposals made it clear that residents of the
target-area were to be organized as a result of local programs. But use of
existing neighborhood groups was not precluded. Indeed, the pattern of
most programs was to be a separate organizational structure appended
to the existing local government. 8 In 1967, however, something unex-
pected happened: OEO-CAP "radicals" left that agency and became
HUD employees, causing a considerable shift in personnel from OEO
regional offices to the HUD regional desks.8 9 As a result, HUD lost
control of some of its regional offices.
At the same time that this shift in personnel took place, the vocab-
ulary of black politics was changing rapidly in local debates to "black
power" and "community control." The dynamics that had earlier
broadened the base of CAP programs were again at work, but this time
the New York HUD regional office to New Haven Mayor Bartholomew Guida. New
Haven Reg., March 17, 1970, at 44, col. 1.
85 CDA Letter No. 10B, at 2.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88-Warren, supra note 67.
89 Interview with Robert C. Wood, supra note 43. A notable example was the turn-
over in Region VI, the San Francisco Region.
There were several reasons for this turnover. CAP and OEO were just then coming
under congressional scrutiny, and some personnel thought they had played out their
roles within OEO's organization. Moreover, HUD fundings and the scope of the program
were very alluring, particularly since that was a time of budgetary tightness for OEO.
Also, the first Director of OEO, Sargent Shriver, was then thinking of leaving his post
and a change at the top with all of its consequences looked imminent.
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in an atmosphere of urgency; 1967 and 1968 had been years in which
American cities erupted in riot. The Model Cities Program, then, was
formulated just prior to a major shift in the temperament of urban
politics. It had to adapt somewhat or not participate in these new
debates, and its adaptation was hastened by the presence of former
OEO employees. In this way, Model Cities programs became a kind
of safety valve for citizen complaints needing immediate outlet, and
the programs adopted participatory components that made them look
like the "poverty sector open forums" of the CAP programs. All this
was unintended and unanticipated when the program was devised.90
With the capture of Model Cities by the "OEO attitude" came
the expanded concept of participation. As in 1967 OEO had responded
to city hall pressure by providing special task forces of experts, so in
response to similar pressure in 1968 HUD authorized Model Cities
groups to hire their own technical advisers."1 In the end, the mayors
seem to have won out over OEO, and CDA Letter No. 10A represents
a similar step in that direction for Model Cities.
At present, however, with all of these contradictory regulations and
standards outstanding, and with the conflicts administratively unre-
solved, it is impossible to predict what the future of participation in
Model Cities will be.92 Because the success of one aspect of participa-
tion has made the poor aware of litigable rights and because the
recently expanded concept of standing has made it easier for citizen
beneficiaries to challenge governmental programs in federal courts,93
that future may, in large measure, be determined by the courts.
90 Id. Despite these changes at the local level, however, the federal view of participa-
tion remained one of "shared power" throughout the Johnson Administration. In order to
implement this idea, federal officials always insisted that the city formally receive the
grant and be legally responsible for it. Interview with H. Ralph Taylor, supra note 29.
Sometimes this was only a pro forma arrangement, as in the case of New Haven where a
neighborhood corporation handled the program virtually on its own. Even there, how-
ever, when the planning grant was approved, the Assistant Secretary wrote to the city's
Redevelopment Director stating his opinion that the proposed city-corporation liaison
would not work. Id.
91 TAB No. 3, at 18-19.
92 It is difficult to fathom the purpose of HUD in allowing this situation to
develop. Any one of several conclusions may be reached: (1) HUD wants administrative
flexibility to apply these standards on a program-by-program basis; (2) HUD wants
local programs to burn themselves out trying to meet all of these conflicting standards; or
(3) HUD wants to minimize conflict on the local level. A presidential task force oh
Model Cities, headed by Edward Banfield of Harvard University, has criticized federal
agencies for overregulating the program and for providing inadequate support. PRESIDENT's
TAsK FoRcE ON MODEL CirIs, MODEL CrriEs: A STEP TowARms Tsm NEw FEDERAISM 14
(1970).
93 E.g., Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
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IV
PARTICIPATION IN THE COURTS
The earliest precedent on the validity of citizen participation in
federal programs is a case sustaining the constitutionality of the Ten-
nessee Valley Authority. Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA94 up-
held the activities of a federal agency that dealt directly with its clien-
tele, for TVA in a sense by-passed state governments. Although many
of the issues in the TVA case have been glossed over by the increased
federal presence in local affairs, the problems of federalism it presents
are at the root of more recent controversies.
The case of Benson v. Minneapolis5 is indicative of the drift to-
ward decentralized government in the 1960's. This case arose when
HUD offered Minneapolis a Model Cities planning grant early in the
local planning process. Mrs. Benson, a resident of a proposed Model
Cities area, sought to bring a class action as a federal taxpayer attack-
ing the validity of the Demonstration Cities Act. Ruling on her motion
for a three-judge court, the opinion dismissed, without much discus-
sion, seven constitutional objections as insubstantial and not requiring
the convening of a three-judge panel.90
Although Benson was not primarily concerned with the concept
of "widespread citizen participation," Judge Lassen wrote approvingly
of the notion:
The court agrees that the Act of Congress requires widespread
citizen participation. This participation is required at a time later
than the time we are concerned with here. The Court will judicially
notice the fact that there has already been substantial and extensive
and widespread participation by citizens in that part of Minneap-
olis to be benefited by the Model Cities legislation. 97
The action was brought prematurely, however, and the court quite
properly refused to consider it as a test of the participatory process.
A plaintiff in a more recent case, North City Area-Wide Council,
Inc. v. Romney, 98 was a non-profit corporation created to administer
the Model Cities program in Philadelphia. Its membership comprised
94 21 F. Supp. 947 (E.D. Tenn. 1938), aJ'd, 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
95 286 F. Supp. 614 (D. Minn. 1968).
90 The court held that Mrs. Benson was the right kind of taxpayer to bring this
litigation but still lacked standing to sue "at this time" because she had shown no
"specific constitutional limitations . . . upon the exercise of Congressional taxing and
spending powers." Id. at 619.
97 Id. at 618-19.
98 Civil No. 69-1909 (ED. Pa. Nov. 10, 1969), rev'd, 428 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1970).
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neighborhood groups "organized in the target area from a large number
of existing organizations. . . ."9 The history of conflicts between the
city and this citizens' group spanned two years. 100 In the fall of 1966,
Philadelphia officials learned that the city would probably get a grant
under the Model Cities program. The Mayor appointed a task force
to draft an application for funds, hoping to get this application to
Washington the following March. A Washington lobbyist was ap-
pointed chairman and a member of the Philadelphia Human Relations
Commission was made a member of the group. It was the latter who
pushed for more citizen representation, and gradually the task force
committees opened their membership to the affected community. As
finally written, the application contained broad promises of citizen
input.
Since the city officials (and some citizens) were confident that
the 350-page application would be accepted by HUD, negotiations with
the city began immediately over the internal structure of the Area-Wide
Council (AWC), as the citizens' group came to be called. Conflicts
quickly developed. AWC supported some student groups protesting
the city's school system; one protest developed into a student-police con-
frontation in front of the school administration building. After that,
the city's development coordinator demanded that the AWC stick to
planning. The level of funding was also in dispute. The question con-
cerned the amount of the city's Model Cities grant that would go to
support staff for AWC.
On August 21, 1967, AWC and the city of Philadelphia entered
into a contract under which the city designated the organization as the
"citizen's participation component of the City's Model Cities Pro-
gram" and agreed that the AWC would assist in planning and develop-
ing such a program.101 On December 31, 1968, the city applied to HUD
for more planning money and funds to implement a plan that AWC
had helped devise. HUD officials returned this plan because of the
large amounts requested. No objection was made at that time to the
application's proposed organizational scheme, which called for imple-
mentation of the plan through a series of non-profit corporations sub-
stantially controlled by AWC members. The city and AWC thereafter
99 North City Area-Wide Council, Inc. v. Romney, 428 F.2d 754, 756 (Sd Cir. 1970)
(footnote omitted).
100 Much of the following background material is taken from Arnstein, Maximum
Feasible Manipulation, 4 CiTy, Oct-Nov. 1970, at 30. This article is an edited statement of
the plaintiffs' version of the facts in Area-Wide Council.
101 Originally, this contract was to run for one year, but subsequent amendments
extended it to June 50, 1969. Stipulation, North City Area-Wide Council, Inc. v. Roney,
Civil No. 69-1909, at 1 (EIl. Pa. Nov. 10, 1969).
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scaled down their requests for funds and resubmitted the application.10 2
On May 27, 1969, the Assistant Secretary of HUD for Intergov-
ernmental Relations, Floyd H. Hyde, informed the city that HUD
found a "conflict of interest" in the fact that AWC would become both
planner, implementer (through the various non-profit corporations),
and, in effect, evaluator of its own work in the field. Moreover, HUD
stated that the involvement of the city was insufficient and required
that no more than one-third of the initial board of directors was to
come from the organization.13 Prompted by these objections, the local
Model Cities Administrator promulgated the following regulations on
June 9, 1969, without consulting AWC: (1) that the citizens' organiza-
tion would designate "not more than one-third of the incorporators" and
"Board of Directors"; (2) that the city was to designate the remainder
of the incorporators, and, where more than one-third of the directors
were to be community representatives, they were to be appointed from
membership lists of other community groups, in consultation with the
city but with the Administrator's decision as final; and (3) that the
city would regularly review the organization's personnel policies and
manning tables. These new regulations were submitted to Washington
as part of an amended application. 104
As the city and its citizens moved toward their courtroom show-
down, hindsight reveals three primary causes of distrust. First, person-
nel turnover was high on both sides of the partnership. The Model
Cities Administrator who finally brought the issues into the open was
the fourth such Administrator. The leadership of AWC had turned
over twice in the same time. The city seldom consulted before appoint-
ing new liaison officials, and city audits of AWC offices "harassed"
the community. Second, the city was working under self-imposed dead-
lines that the neighborhood did not understand. AWC felt pressured
into designing a work program that the city believed would appeal to
HUD, and it thought that the deadlines set by the city were unrealistic.
The city wanted to design a program of action that would receive a
"Letter to Proceed" from HUD officials before the Democrats left office
in January 1969. After that, there would be a hiatus that would delay
HUD action while the new officials set policy and direction for the
agency. Finally, the city, starting in January 1969, wanted to cut the
AWC staff in size from fifty-five to twenty-two. At this, AWC was nat-
urally enraged.10 5
102 Complaint, North City Area-Wide Council, Inc. v. Romney, Civil No. 69-1909,
at 7-8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 1969) [hereinafter cited as Complaint].
103 Id., exhibit D.
104 Id., exhibit G.
105 Arnstein, supra note 100, at 35.
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In the suit, a class action brought by AWC and a number of area
residents, plaintiffs charged that the effect of the regulations of June
9, 1969, was to violate the "widespread citizen participation" require-
ment of the Demonstration Cities Act. They also contended that the
application, as amended, no longer reflected their planning and devel-
opment and that various HUD regulations had been violated.10 6
Averring that the city "intends to organize.., a new group to repre-
sent the citizens of the target area... ," plaintiffs sought to preserve
the status quo. 107 Among other things, the court was asked to order:
(1) that the federal defendants were not to use the requirements laid
down in HUD's 1969 letter to the city as criteria in evaluating the city's
application; (2) that an injunction should issue barring the city from
contracting with another citizens' group without court approval; and
(3.) that the city be required to maintain AWC at its prelitigation fund-
ing level so that the organization could remain intact. 08
The district court dismissed the complaint on motions for sum-
mary judgment by HUD and the city, ruling that the citizen plaintiffs
lacked "standing" to contest the actions of the city. 0 9 Then the court
noted that, assuming plaintiffs did have the requisite standing, the
complaint would fail. The court stated that participation had not been
diminished: the more people involved, whether appointed or elected,
the more "participation" there would be. 0 Finally, it ruled in favor
of the city and the Model Cities Administrator, approving the rule
that mayoral appointees have at least one-third of all seats on the
operating boards."'
The district court said the dispositive issue was
whether the action of the city, in forwarding a supplementary
statement, without the participation, review or indorsement of
AWC and the subsequent acceptance of said supplementary state-
ment was violative of the Model Cities Act in that it did not pro-
vide for wide-spread citizen participation." 2
But having said that the city's actions were on trial, it then held that
the Act's requirement of administrative coordination between various
city agencies" 3 made this question irrelevant: the established political
106 Complaint 13.
107 Id. at 16. On June 30, 1969, the city ceased to employ AWC in the program.
A subsequent offer was made to recontract subject to the new regulations, but AWC's
board rejected it. Id. at 13, 15.
108 Id. at 17-19.
109 Civil Action No. 69-1909, at 6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 1969).
110 Id. at 10.
III Id.
112 Id. at 9.
116 42 U.S.C. § 3304(b)(2) (Supp. V, 1970).
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structure could, under the guise of effecting coordination, fill seats on
the operating boards. Finding that the plaintiffs misconstrued the
notion of citizen participation, the court said, in effect, that the city
administration had merely required the addition of another citizens'
group. 114 The court failed to consider that the Mayor's appointees
might override or replace neighborhood representatives and thus con-
trol the Model Cities program. Whether such substitution was allow-
able and within the statute was the real issue, but the court never
discussed it.
The facts of Area-Wide Council suggest some of the difficulties
inherent in a judicial determination of the scope of public participa-
tion in antipoverty programs. In the first place, the contract for plan-
ning services expired midway through the dispute. Second, the con-
tract itself was poorly drawn: it did no more than repeat the language
of the participation sections of the Act and it in no way defined the
right to participate. The district court believed that the more groups
and interests represented, the better the concept of participation was
served. The court did not consider the political relationships among
representatives, the dilution of political impact resulting from the ex-
pansion of the boards, and the results of adding new parties to the then
coalescing network of antipoverty politicians. In effect, the court did
not define "citizen participation" at all. Developing a political system
inevitably takes time, and judicial tampering with the process is likely
to destroy political relationships. After litigation, the process is in-
evitably set back as the actors regroup.
Unfortunately, an awareness of these difficulties also eluded the
Third Circuit, which considered the case on appeal.115 The court as-
sumed that, in light of recent Supreme Court pronouncements," 6 AWC
had standing to challenge HUD's grant to the city, but in reversing and
remanding the case, the court did not articulate its view of participation
in any detail. It merely said that any "fundamental changes" in the pro-
gram, which it found the city's and HUD's actions to be, required
citizen participation. The community participants, the court said, did
not
claim to possess a veto over proposals by the City or HUD. They
contend, however, they have the right to be consulted and to parti-
cipate in the planning and carrying out of the program. Such a
114 Civil No. 69-1909, at 10 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 1969).
115 North City Area-Wide Council, Inc. v. Romney, 428 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1970).
116 Barlow v. Collins, 597 U.S. 159 (1970); Association of Data Processing Serv.
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
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right-within the provisions of the Act-is in fact required by
HUD's own administrative pronouncements.
[.. T]he issue is not citizen veto or even approval but citizen
participation, negotiation, and consultation in the major decisions
which are made for a particular Model Cities Program. While
not every decision regarding a Program may require full citizen
participation, certainly decisions which change the basic strategy
of the Program do require such participation.117
The court then noted that the program had previously
contemplated a much heavier involvement by the designated citizen
participation component, AWC. This involvement was drastically
reduced by the unilateral actions of the City and HUD. The
Secretary therefore violated the Act when he accepted a proposal
for major modification of the Model Cities Program from the City
which made clear on its face there had been no citizen participation
in its formulation, and when he imposed additional significant
terms of his own without citizen consultation. 118
Crucial terms are here left for future definition: "veto power," "basic
program strategy," "major decisions," and "significant terms." No clear
definition of "participation" emerges.
In support of its decision, the Third Circuit relied on that
language in the Act directing the Secretary to "emphasize local initia-
tive" and provide for "widespread citizen participation." 119 But the
issue for decision turned on facts involving the contractual relation-
ship of the AWC with the city, not the depth of support and involve-
ment of target-area residents in the program. Moreover, the meaning
of these statutory phrases was not made clear by their legislative history.
Considering the ambiguity of the Act itself, more interesting and
to the point is the Third Circuit's reliance on CDA Letter No. 3.120
It would appear that the court was really requiring conformity of the
city-AWC program with administrative regulations--if that is in fact
what CDA Letters are.' 2 ' This aspect of Area-Wide Council might make
117 428 F.2d at 757-58.
118 Id. at 758.
119 42 U.S.C. §§ 3303(a)-(b) (Supp. V, 1970).
120 "'[C]itizens in the model neighborhood area'" are to be "'fully involved in
policy-making, planning and the execution of all program elements."' 428 F.2d at 758,
quoting CDA Letter No. 3, at 1.
121 The court did not decide that all actions taken by the city and HUD with
respect to the program after June 1969 were illegal. Counsel for AWC stipulated in oral
argument that there was no need to reach this issue. Id. at 758. Hence, those actions
remain in limbo. Reversing the district court, the Third Circuit merely remanded the
1971]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
the case an important precedent for any future litigation over the pro-
gram because the facts litigated involved a situation which CDA Letter
No. 10A may well generate in the future.122 The regulations on which
HUD and the city agreed, without citizen assent, resemble the guide-
lines of CDA Letter No. 10A. Just how a court could reconcile the
statutory reasoning of the Third Circuit opinion and also require con-
formity with CDA Letter No. 10A in a case involving similar facts is
unclear.123
V
A SUGGESTION FOR JUDICIAL ANALYSIS
In general, courts might view participation in two ways. It might
be defined narrowly in terms of representation. If it is, the appropriate
questions involve the nature of the interests represented and the role
of the representative. On the other hand, it is also reasonable to view
participation as a process. If it is a "shared experience," as Robert C.
Wood has said,124 participation is a process in which each party's role
interlocks with the roles of others and all are dependent on each other
for the effective functioning of the system. In order not to prejudice
the working (much less the outcome) of the network, no one party
should be allowed to interfere with the functioning of any other party.
In other words, once elected and after the planning stage, representa-
tives should, under either definition, be secure in their roles as partici-
pants.
Whichever definition is accepted, the result may depend on a
sufficiently well-drawn contract between the city government and
Model Cities groups. The scope and extent of participation, elections,
case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The problems inherent in
writing an order still remain for that court.
122 CDA Letter No. 10A had not been issued at the time of the district court
decision, and its effect was neither raised by the parties nor discussed by the court of
appeals. The case was thus decided under the regulations existing at the time the
contract was made.
123 To some extent, this case may finally wind up in the same stance as Thorpe v.
Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268 (1969). There, a HUD circular arguably mooted the
question presented, and here CDA Letter No. 10A, if harmonized with CDA Letter No. 3
and TAB No. 3, does the same. But the circular involved in Thorpe incorporated one
possible interpretation of a prior judicial decision into HUD's regulations governing
eviction from public housing. It is by no means clear that CDA Letter No. 10A can be
reconciled with Area-Wide Council.
124 "To recognize that the genuine experience of participation is shared experience--
not the creation of a separate presence---is the beginning of wisdom in our present
urban efforts." Wood, supra note 43, at 8.
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options to extend the contract, and rules governing tenure and re-
moval of City Demonstration Agency directors should be covered ex-
plicity in future contracts. In lieu of a contract, a local ordinance
might control the same questions. The effect of such an ordinance on
a federal program, and its binding effect on federal authorities, is of
course open to some question, but the approach may be worth trying.125
The situation presented in Area-Wide Council was the result of
a shift in HUD's administrative policies. The facts show that HUD's
national administration has had difficulty rationalizing the citizen
participation component of Model Cities in administrative terms. That
is, it cannot "balance" participation and what it conceives to be good
administration. Hence its communication to Philadelphia officials talked
in terms of legal rules designed to ensure "efficient," honest administra-
tion. In at least these respects, HUD is now trying to impose admin-
istrative constraints on the citizen participation component of Model
Cities. This would be proper if experienced administrators were in-
volved, but here it may well result in a case of bureaucratic overkill:
the burdening of a program with so many requirements that it burns
itself out trying to contend with them all.
It has been shown that citizen participation can serve a useful
administrative purpose in well-designed bureaucratic programs. 126
What, however, if bureaucracy has no definitive program, or mix of
programs? What if its priorities have not been set beforehand? This was
the case with Model Cities. The federal government admitted that it
was bankrupt of new ideas to save our cities from their problems and
so it turned to the local communities. The legislative history makes
clear that the citizen participation requirement was intended to fuse
the planning and later administrative functions. Thus, the question of
continuing a local program, as in Philadelphia, under community con-
trol, must be decided by the community itself.
How should a plaintiff go about proving this and asking for
reinstatement of future AWC's in court?127 First, someone knowledge-
able about past governmental efforts at participation might be called
as an expert witness. His testimony should discuss the frustration and
distrust that result when participation serves administrative purposes
125 This approach was taken in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Cambridge, Mass.,
Ordinance No. 766 (May 20, 1968).
126 Text accompanying notes 1-19 supra.
127 Of course, there are several ways and what follows is a suggestion that assumes
plaintiffs' attorneys are given an opportunity to present the court with evidence designed
to show that the basic premises of the program rest on the outcome and impact of the
particular case.
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only. He should recite the history of participation in Urban Renewal
in the 1950's and 1960's, the rising expectations created and then con-
strained by participation in OEO programs, and the middle ground of
participation in Model Cities: a compromise at its inception but now
threatened with annihilation by rulings from Washington. A second
witness could be a city planner familiar with the history of his profes-
sion. He might trace the development of the concept of advocate or
adversary planners who work for neighborhood or minority groups
as a planning staff. The thrust of this testimony would be to emphasize
the need for an independent staff backing up citizens. 12 8 The third
witness could be an expert in the functioning of bureaucracy and the
administrative process. The testimony he gives would indicate how
compartmentalization of planning, staff, and line functions stall or kill
a program. He could point out that the distinction between operating
and evaluative functions is sound, but that evaluations should not be
performed on the local level anyway; since Washington will inherently
mistrust such reviews, this particular allegation of conflict of interest
is a "make-weight" issue on HUD's part. A fourth line of argument
could be elicited from a sociologist or social psychologist. This testi-
mony should provide some insight into why issues like this arise. The
citizens' group, the argument might go, is in a sense testing the extent
of its freedom and competence, much as a child tests himself and his
parents. The present conflict is thus preliminary, even a precondition,
to the development of a further working relationship. Furthermore,
if a new group were formed, the same process with similar conflicts at
the end of it would most likely recur.
One more point might be raised. It has to do with the function
of the program vis-A-vis its potential beneficiaries. If Model Cities is to
provide programs traditionally carried out by government, then its
actions are as important to the residents as those of any government
would be..'2 9 As in any community, elected officials are not to be turned
out of "office" lightly, and courts should deal with this situation
accordingly. In a pluralistic, mobile society, the seat of government is
where power is, not necessarily in city hall. Courts would do well to
see to it that appropriate legal safeguards follow citizens when they
themselves become a locus of power. Initially, this means that the role
128 The need for them has a dual origin: (1) in the idea that comprehensive, public
agency planning, as it is traditionally carried on, is really middle-class oriented and
either ignores or leaves the poor unrepresented in the planning process; and (2) in the
distrust with which poverty groups view city hall.
129 M. KOTLER, NEIGHBoRHooD Gov NM Nr 81-87 (1969).
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of courts may be to recognize and legitimate "government" so that they
can better control it later.
Although some take heart from the Third Circuit's decision in
Area-Wide Council, personnel morale in Model Cities is sagging badly
around the country.130 On October 1, 1970, Secretary Romney an-
nounced his intention to give fiscal and program-review powers over local
efforts to a selected group of mayors.'-" If this had been done in
Philadelphia, the outcome of Area-Wide Council might have been
different.
In light of this uncertainty one further difficulty with the Third
Circuit's opinion remains: whether the "participation, negotiation,
and consultation" it required encompasses all the parties to the grant
-that is, the city, the citizens, and HUD.
What if HUD refuses to give the city the grant unless conditions
are imposed on citizen participation? In that case, of course, the city
will tend to capitulate and hope it can persuade the citizens to accept
them. This was the situation when Philadelphia was negotiating with
HUD in the spring of 1969. So the scope of negotiations should realis-
tically include the city and citizens on one side, and HUD on the other
side of the bargaining table. As to the programmatic content of the
plans themselves, this is consistent with the idea, contained in the
legislative history as interpreted by the administrators of the Act, of
"stretching" the capacity of local government to deal with a broader
range of its citizenry and present their case to Washington. However,
when the participation of citizens is itself called into question, HUD's
role must change if it is to carry out the all-sector "local initiative"
mandate of the Act. It must become a negotiator and mediator between
city and citizens; it must judge questions of participation, subject to
judicial review. On such issues, negotiation must be triangular-be-
tween HUD, the city, and the citizens on a "face-to-face" basis.
The trouble then with the Third Circuit opinion is that it does
not say enough. To hold that HUD and the city acted "unilaterally"
does not say how the prior negotiations should have been arranged.
Like the Vietnamese Peace talks in Paris, the problem is the size and
shape of the bargaining table. Ultimately, however, courts should con-
fine the issues of such cases to matters of the contract. Construing such
180 N.Y. Times, April 26, 1970, at 1, col. 1, reported that President Nixon was
considering diverting the 500 million allocated in fiscal 1971 to Model Cities for an
upgrading of programs in center city schools. Secretary Romney worked to have this
decision rescinded and was successful.
181 Washington Post, Oct. 1, 1970, at 1, coL 1.
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contracts, however loosely drawn, will make future contracts of this
type more detailed. Future negotiators will be forced to think through
questions of tenure, powers, and replacement of participating citizens.
Similarly, future courts would be wise to interpret these contracts in
the light of regulations existing at the time the contract was drafted. 12
It might even be argued that administrators should generally be con-
fined to enforcing only prior regulations on federal grants; with par-
ticipatory programs, this point seems particularly well founded. Other-
wise, ad hoc administration gives program flexibility at the expense of
citizen participation. In such situations, it is difficult for participation
to function at all.
The problem of citizen participation in Model Cities is one of
bureaucracy generally. It is possible to have so many rules and regula-
tions that a program breaks down under the strain of trying to harmo-
nize all of them. What this country has learned since the New Deal is
that it is virtually impossible to plan and rationally coordinate social
programs. This is not to say that they should be stopped; rather, they
should not be overregulated from Washington. The level of decision-
making power should be scaled down, defederalized, and made a matter
of local control. Given the legislative history of Model Cities, that
program is a good place to start this process.
182 This the Third Circuit did, resting its decision in part on CDA Letter No. 3.
The difficulty lay in the fact that HUD was evidently "trying out" new regulations on
the Philadelphia program.
